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ABSTRACT   The accumulating evidence on the depth and accelerating trajectory of anthropogenic climate 
change poses the possibility of an early end to human existence as part of a more general biotic extinction. 
But if that is the case what does that mean for the latter day writing of history? Our response follows two 
main lines of thought. The first relates to the concept of the ‘Anthropocene’ and the possibilities that it offers 
historians to reconsider their subject in the light of what earth science is saying about earth history and our 
particularly recent role in its shaping. From this perspective, while the idea of a reconceptualised history by 
reference  to  key  geological  and  other  natural  historical  thresholds  would  certainly  destabilise  current 
academic practice, it might equally galvanise the historical discipline towards recognition of our present 
biospheric crisis. The second line of thought explores how history writing might contribute to an ethical 
response in the face of the end and an almost inevitable, accompanying violence, anomie and destruction. 
Apocalyptic language is eschewed by a progress-centred history. Here we argue that it is exactly the proper 
recovery  of  such  discarded  religiously  subversive  notions  which  could  assist  in  the  opening  up  of  an 
alternative  space  repudiating  a  bankrupt  political-economic  system  and  envisioning  instead  a  millennial 
social and environmental justice. The writings of Walter Benjamin, among others, offer historical pathfinders 
for  such  ideas.  Combined  with  his  presentation  of  an  alternative,  qualitative    ‘Now’  time—thereby 
reconfiguring Judeo-Christian notions of kairos—such ideas speak both to the urgency for a purposeful, non-
violent response to Endtime but also by implication, an ongoing human quest for grace. 
 
 
 
Is it conceivable that our species, homo sapiens sapiens, through its undoubted cleverness, has 
brought this planet to the brink of a biospheric destabilisation so enormous that it heralds not 
only our own destruction but that of most if not all of Earth’s multitudinous life forms? A very 
public  answer  from  some  people  with  considerable  sapienza w a s  p r o f f e r e d  i n  t h e  a u g u s t  
surroundings of the Royal Society on 17 January 2007. The Society was playing host to the 
Bulletin  of  Atomic  Scientists  who  60  years  earlier  had  visualised  a  Doomsday  Clock  to 
symbolise the threat to human survival from nuclear weapons. Back in 1991 their clock had 
been  in  abeyance,  at  17  minutes  to  midnight.  Since  then  it  has  been  moving  forward, 
seemingly inexorably. At the 2007 meeting with no less than 18 Nobel Laureates as event 
sponsors, the Bulletin moved the clock forward once again, to five minutes to midnight. This 
time, however, the grounds cited for the gloomy prognostication were not just a matter of 
nuclear arsenals. The danger posed by anthropogenic climate change, the Bulletin pronounced, 154 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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equally threatened “irremediable harm to the habitats upon which human societies depend for 
survival.”
1 
How much does climate change actually change a picture we already know? From the 
moment  when  the  first  atomic  bomb  was  detonated  at  Trinity  on  16  July  1945, there  has 
existed a human potential for planetary destruction. Granted, the potential has not been vested 
in us all equally. As then, so now, nuclear weapons are a statement of political as well as 
technological  power  and  domination.  But  while  this  might  offer  historians  among  the  last 
women and men a final occasion to debate the hegemonic origins of the present world order, 
the reality of the weapons’ primed existence underscores the ongoing twilight zone nature of 
our existence. Nor, even if the nuclear weapons were not there, would we require climate 
change to confirm “that we are now in a great dying time of evolutionary history.”
2 In 1972, in 
response to a Club of Rome commission, a group of MIT systems analysts constructed a model 
of global humanity which forecast that on the basis of exponential growth patterns in industrial 
and  food  production,  resource  depletion,  population  and  pollution,  a  resulting  ecological 
overshoot was likely to engender a universal economic and societal collapse sometime in the 
21
st century.
3 Despite a torrent of criticism for its alleged neo-Malthusianism, the findings of 
Limits to Growth have only been corroborated in similar, more recent assessments.
4   
At first sight, it is not obvious how anthropogenic climate change alters this prospect or 
competes with the nuclear threat. Our millennia-long impact on the climate has not been a 
conscious, nor obviously malign one. On the contrary, one might argue that it is simply an 
indirect consequence of essentially constructive efforts at self-betterment, the recent emergence 
of a fossil fuel-based economy underpinning both the planetary reality of a seven billion-plus 
human population and material and physical comforts for a significant proportion of them 
beyond even the wildest dreams of once great kings. The manner, moreover, by which climate 
change will bring disaster, or when, exactly, that might be, is opaque. Neither with a bang, nor 
necessarily a whimper, its remoteness from our daily lives and lack of apparent existential 
threat compared with the ever-present possibility of Cold War nuclear Armageddon, plus the 
obvious scientific complexity of understanding cause and effect, are all sufficient grounds for 
most people to push it to the very margins of their consciousness, or to deny its existence 
altogether.    
Unfortunately, what such responses tell us most about is a human propensity to avoid 
or repudiate unpalatable truths, particularly when those truths are bound up inextricably with 
the way we (certainly a Western ‘we’) live.
5 We may not be able to pin down with exactitude 
its  precise  contours  or  timeline  but  the  scientific  evidence  on  the  reality  of  anthropogenic 
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1 See http://thebulletin.org/content/mediacenter/announcements/2007/01/17/doomsday-clock-moves-
two-minutes-closer-to-midnight. 
2 Alastair McIntosh, Hell and High Water: Climate Change, Hope and the Human Condition (Edinburgh: 
Birlinn, 2008), 191. 
3 Donatella Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome on the Predicament of 
Mankind (New York: Universe Books, 1972). 
4 For example the, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report (Washington DC: Island, 2005). 
5 Clive Hamilton, Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist the Truth about Climate Change (London: 
Earthscan, 2010), for searing indictment.  Levene, Climate Blues / 155 
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climate change and its planetary, especially biotic consequences is now overwhelming.
6 It is 
not the purpose here to reprise the scientific arguments. The purpose is to ask what this means 
for our understanding of that element of cross-generational human experience we have come 
to describe as ‘history.’ Whether we will be able during this century to keep the nuclear genie 
in its box remains an open question. But by dint of hysteresis—in other words the time-lag 
before  carbon  dioxide  and  other  greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  accumulations  in  the  atmosphere 
really kick in—climate change will accelerate even if it were possible to turn off the fossil-fuel 
engine now.
7 It is this very engine which is first cause as to why we are where we are. Though 
the  relationship  between  ourselves  and  ‘Nature’  is  not  actually  dialectical,  we  might  still, 
nevertheless, perceive the biospheric feedbacks, or more exactly ‘blowbacks’ now setting in, as 
Nature’s antithesis to the globalised carbon economy we have created. If the latter continues 
on its present upward trajectory, the synthesis of this imagined argument will not be human 
fulfilment. It will be its foreclosure. 
The challenge for scholars, in the coming precious years, lies in the degree to which we 
choose  to  link  our  disciplinary  explorations  to  urgent  ethical  responsibilities.  The  most 
fundamental of these, now, as perhaps always, relates not only to matters of human conduct 
with each other. What equally is at stake is our responsibility to those life forms on this planet 
whose future fate has unknowingly become one of utter dependence on us but without whose 
existence our own sustainability as a species is null and void.    
As the truth sinks in, in what will inevitably be a monumental societal crisis of hope—
we will be required to tear down many, perhaps all of our standard assumptions as to how 
history  ‘works’  and  begin  a  probably  very  painful  process  of  ‘reconstruction.’  Working 
backwards  we  almost  certainly  will  wish  to  reconsider  the  very  basic  map  of  history—the 
architecture of human experience over centuries and millennia—to understand how we arrived 
at  this  end-game.  From  this  perspective,  too,  it  may  be  that  some  areas  of  great  recent 
historiographical debate become academic, superfluous, even quaint. By the same token, other 
elements  which  point  to  practical  resilience  or  moral  compassion  in  the  face  of  past 
environmental  breakdown  or a c u t e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  i n s e c u r i t y  m a y  t a k e  o n  m a g n i f i e d  
importance. Paradoxically, this may lead us in directions many historians have been at pains to 
distance themselves from in recent decades: structure, metanarrative, even teleology. What 
really matters, though, is whether historians have the heart, guts, and ‘ethical fire,’ to grasp the 
enormity of what is now required of them. 
R.G.  Collingwood,  in  1939,  proposed:  “We  might  very  well  be  standing  on  the 
threshold of an age in which history would be as important for the world as natural science has 
been between 1600 and 1900.”
8 More than 70 years on, history can have that role. But to do 
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6 See the meta-analysis by Ilya M. D. Maclean and Robert J. Wilson, “Recent Ecological Responses to 
Climate Change Support Predictions of High Extinction Risk,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Science 11 July 2011, which suggests an 11 per cent species’ extinction by end of this century, and the 
further assessment by 22 leading earth scientists in Anthony D. Barnosky, et al., “Approaching a State 
Shift in Earth’s Biosphere,” Nature 486, 6 June (2012): 52-58. 
7 See Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows, “Reframing the Climate Change Challenge in Light of Post-2000 
Emission Trends,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 366, no.1882 (2008): 3863–3882. 
8 From R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, quoted here in Paul Dukes, Minutes to Midnight, History 
and the Anthropocene Era from 1763 (London: Anthem Press, 2011), 92. 156 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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so historians would have to be willing to eschew the conventional wisdoms most of us have 
chosen to live by. Our purposefulness firstly, would be in showing how these wisdoms, far 
from being normative, self-evident and benign, are instead indicative of a particularly toxic 
turn  in  the  human  trajectory  whose  ultimate  planetary  riposte  has  been  none  other  than 
climate change. Secondly, and more importantly, it might be to suggest how—even in the face 
of the end—the past can assist humanity towards alternative ways of right-living. With the 
bridge between the two being the present. The rest of this argument follows this three-part, if 
interlinked schema.  
 
Past 
In  a  recent  piece  in  Rethinking History,  Penelope  Corfield,  revisited  the  notion  of  staging 
history and whether it is objectively possible to offer clear breaks between one age and another. 
With a cacophony of voices all offering their own subjective criteria, the idea that historians 
can arrive at some consensus as to where and when, for instance, Modernity—or even more 
nebulously Post-Modernity—begins, is bound to fail. Corfield’s own response is not to throw 
the  baby  out w i t h  t h e  b a t h -water  but  to  offer  a  three-dimensional  model  which  might 
incorporate  “very  long-term  micro-changes”  alongside  dramatic  revolutionary  “breaks” 
enabling  turmoil,  momentum  and  persistence,  to  “intersect  and  cross-impact  in  complexly 
different  ways  in  different  eras  and  climes.”
9 This  is  sane,  sensitive  and  well-considered 
historical thinking. However, in the light of what we now know about the human trajectory’s 
impact on the natural historical continuum, is the Corfield model really the most appropriate 
for ongoing historical good practice? 
Let me offer instead an approach which takes its cue not from historians but earth 
scientists.  In  2000  the  atmospheric  physicist  and  Nobel  Laureate,  Paul  J.  Crutzen,  and  his 
marine scientist colleague, Eugene F. Stoermer, proposed that we now inhabit the epoch of the 
Anthropocene.
10 Clearly,  some  cross-reference  to  other  successive  geological p e r i o d s  w a s  
intended in this statement. But what was entirely more startling was the proposition that this 
new geological sequence was the result of human activity on a global scale, or, put another 
way, anthropogenic agency was “changing the most basic physical processes of the earth.”
11 
Actually,  the  idea  was  not  new.  In  the  1920s,  the  great  Ukrainian  earth  scientist  and 
metaphysician,  Vladimir  Vernadsky,  had  recognised  that  an  increase  in  human-caused 
biogenic  gases  in  the  atmosphere  could  be  dated  to  the  18
th c e n t u r y .
12 But  Crutzen  and 
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9 Penelope J. Corfield, “POST-Medievalism/Modernity/Postmodernity?” Rethinking History 14, no. 3 
(2010): 395.   
10 Paul J. Crutzen, and Eugene F. Stoermer, “The ‘Anthropocene,’” Global Change Newsletter 41(2000): 
17-18. 
11 Naomi Oreskes, “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change: How Do We Know We’re not 
Wrong?” in Climate Change, What it Means for Us, Our Children, Our Grandchildren, eds. Joseph F. C. 
Dimento and Pamel Doughman (Cambridge MA. 2007), 93. 
12 Oliver Smith, “The Ecology of History: Russian Thought on the Future of the World,” in Ecological 
Awareness: Exploring Religion, Ethics and Aesthetics, eds. Sigurd Bergmann and Heather Eaton (Berlin 
and London: Lit-Verlag, 2011), 125-26. Smith’s article also considers Vernadsky’s hopes that human 
consciousness would help transform the biosphere into a new, better condition, which he called the 
‘noosphere.’ Levene, Climate Blues / 157 
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Stoermer had at their disposal data from retrieved glacial ice cores enabling them to more 
precisely mark the threshold associated with this shift. They agreed that assigning a specific 
date might seem “somewhat arbitrary.” However, up to c.1750-1800 GHG concentrations had 
been stable for a relatively long time, carbon dioxide, for instance at 280 parts per million. 
After  then,  its  almost  inexorable  increase,  year  on  year,  to  the  present  c.390  ppm  closely 
mirrored the acceleration of energy usage from fossil fuels which began with the Industrial 
Revolution. Crutzen and Stoermer noted the coincidence between James Watt’s invention of 
the steam engine in 1784 and the onset of their proposed new geological epoch. More recent 
historical  consideration  by  Paul  Dukes  resets  the  threshold  at  1763,  citing  not  just 
technological but others factors associated with the geopolitical rise of Britain to hegemonic 
status.
13 What is interesting about the Crutzen-Stoermer thesis is the degree to which it infers 
changes in earth system processes can also be applied historically. 
But is such conflation of the historical and geological justified? The term Anthropocene 
has yet to become standard currency, though there has been sufficient acclamation from a 
wide range of scientific and non-scientific disciplines to suggest its durability.
14 There is, to be 
sure, a wider, in some respects different debate about the degree to which human activity, 
especially  associated  with  deforestation  and  the  advent  of  intensive  farming,  was  already 
causing  climate  change  as  long  as  8,000  years  ago.  William  Ruddiman,  for  instance,  has 
proposed that rising atmospheric methane concentrations in particular, as caused by millennia-
long Eurasian agriculture, may well have slowed down a scientifically-anticipated earlier return 
to ice-age conditions.
15 Ruddiman, however, has not challenged a basic premise that only in 
very recent time has the human impact on climate exceeded that of Nature.
16 If the notion of 
the Anthropocene, thus offers an historical marker for what formerly we might have spoken of 
as the advent of Modernity, what would using broader geological criteria reward us with for 
the rest of ‘history’?  
Such  an  earth-centred  staging  could  only  seriously  offer  a  basic  tripartite  division. 
Working back from the late 18
th century divide, the comparable moment prior would be the 
last  time  there  was  significant  climate  change—in  this  case  caused  by  a n a t u r a l  o r b i t a l  
oscillation of the planet c.11-10,000 year ago. This brought to the estimated five to ten million 
humans at that time a quite rapid deliverance from the severe glacial conditions of the Younger 
Dryas and in its place offered a much warmer but also relatively stable (inter-glacial) Holocene 
epoch which enabled them to take “increasing control over biospheric flows of energy and 
resources.” The species, by then, was already almost ubiquitous with further indication of its 
ever-widening “ecological virtuosity” expressed in the rise of its global population to over 500 
million, by c.1500.
17 In turn, if we were to travel back in time once again to seek the previous 
pre-Holocene  threshold,  the  most  logical  contender  would  not  necessarily  be  the  species’ 
emergence  in  Africa,  some  200,000  years  prior:  not  least  as  palaeontologists  have  yet  to 
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13 Dukes, Minutes, 7, 11-13.  
14 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History: Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry 35, Winter (2009): 210. 
15 William F. Ruddiman, Plows, Plagues and Petroleum: How Humans Took Control of Climate 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), chapters 8-10. 
16 Ibid., 150.  
17 David Christian, “World Environmental History,” in The Oxford Handbook to World History, ed. Jerry 
H. Bentley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 132, 135. 158 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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determine an exact biological timeline. However, there was a major geological event, some 
73,000 years ago, which arguably does represent the deep historical beginnings of humankind. 
And one all the more remarkable because at the time its consequences pointed not towards the 
promise  of  even  greater  numbers  and  wider  geographical  range  for  this  already  well-
established—species, but on the contrary its extinction.  
The event was the Sumatran Mount Toba volcanic supereruption—the largest in the 
past 25 million years. It threw up so much smog into the atmosphere that it triggered an intense 
ice  age  that  lasted  for  a  millennium.  In  the  course  of  that  estimated  40  generations  our 
ancestors’ numbers plummeted to no more than a few thousand survivors, and possibly only in 
a  handful  of  East  African  enclaves.
18 To  be  sure,  the  turn-around  in  the  species’  prospects 
thereafter can be read as the great breakthrough in its development, this time all the more 
remarkable because this “Revolution of the Upper Palaeolithic” appears not to have involved 
any genetic change but rather a slew of behavioural and cultural ones. But aspects such as “an 
unprecedented degree of social cooperation,” combined with an ability to anticipate changes 
in the environment—the latter the key cognitive tool which would set Homo sapiens apart 
from all other species, other hominids included—were selections and adaptations, it has been 
suggested, directly attributable to the post-Toba shock.
19  
Putting all other issues aside for one moment, these two geological thresholds offer two 
critical pointers on both the continuity and rupture elements of the human trajectory. The first 
is  that  confrontation  with  natural  catastrophe  actually  precipitated  humanity  towards  an 
enhanced problem-solving mindset which enabled them to survive more than 40,000 years of 
further  ice  age—the  major  part  of  our  deep  history.  The  second  is  that  in  spite  of  their 
techniques and organisation for resilience, and thus the precious existential debt we ourselves 
owe to these ancestors, Homo sapiens nevertheless remained entirely dependent on a benign, 
long-term biospheric shift for its full flourishing. Without the onset of the Holocene and with it 
the  “parametric  conditions”  of  a  basic  climatic  stability  which  (mostly)  year  on  year, 
millennium upon millennium, allowed for cereal grasses to grow, humans would not have 
been able from their previous ice age refugia to colonise, or re-colonise the continents, let 
alone engender agriculture and civilisation.
20  
From this perspective David Christian’s plea that “history is not an attribute of human 
society alone, but that the earth itself, life on earth and even the universe have histories,”
21 
should read as perfectly legitimate; doubly so, as we hurtle towards our renewed encounter 
with  extinction.  Christian’s  own  ‘big’  three-part  natural  history-cum-human  history 
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18 Stanley H. Ambrose, “Late Pleistocene Human Population Bottlenecks: Volcanic Winter and 
Differentiation in Modern Humans,” Journal of Human Evolution 34, no. 6 (1998): 623-51.  
19 See Fred Pearce, Confessions of an Eco-Sinner: Travels to Find Where My Stuff Comes From (London: 
Eden Project Books, 2008), chapter 31, “Close Shave: Why We are All Children of Toba,” for cogent 
reinforcement of the Ambrose thesis.  
20 Chakrabarty, “The Climate,” 217-18. 
21 Quoted in Tom Griffiths, “A Humanist on Thin Ice,” Griffith Review 29 (2010), 
http://www.griffithreview.com/edition-29-prosper-or-perish/a-humanist-on-thin-ice. Thanks to Marc 
Hudson for pointing me in the direction of this important article. Levene, Climate Blues / 159 
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periodisation approximates quite closely with the schema herein.
22 His reconfiguration of the 
human aspect into a much deeper cosmic timeframe does not preclude micro-levels. Just as 
geological epochs can be broken down into more specific strata, each sediment with its own 
distinctive signature fossils, so can the detailed human record be equally recovered, through 
increasingly sophisticated environmental techniques. While most historians will not or ever be 
expert in such techniques, each will have other more traditional, including written sources 
with which to argue the case for further breakpoints in such a history.  
Certainly,  such  a  proposition  can  only  engender  intense  disciplinary  resistance.  To 
argue for time-scales, ideas and methods more in keeping with archaeology, geology or even 
astrophysics, would be to demand not only an unconscionable wrench out of most colleagues’ 
comfort zones but an almost perverse desire to wreck the whole order of (very often for the 
individual practitioner, painstakingly mastered) specialisation, each sub-division underpinning 
“entire  systems  of  teaching,  examination,  research  funding,  public  assessment.”
23  More 
tellingly, this working historian, in practice, would display the same caution as others about 
any single causative factor, even a sustained climate one, or its consequent environmental 
impact, determining the course of history, when set against the totality of political, societal and 
cultural trends over decades or even centuries.   
For instance, while a series of combined climate and tectonic plate shocks, c.1250-
1100 BC, associated with the onset of neo-glacial conditions, may have been a key factor in 
bringing  deeply-embedded  Bronze  Age  civilisations  to  a  spectacular  end  in  one  of  several 
Holocene  “Dark  Ages,”
24 did  this  preset  the  slow  and  tortuous  post-Bronze  Age  recovery 
towards  the  even  more  aggressive,  violently  empire-building  civilisations  of  the  new  “Iron 
Age,” or, indeed, to the cosmological life-affirmations of the “Axial Age” religions? By the same 
token, while we now know that it was a climatic shift which was the fundamental cause of first 
the “Great European Famine” of 1315-18, then a generation-later, the epidemiological after-
shock of the wholly more catastrophic Black Death,
25 are we to assume that these events and 
the subsequent related sequence of poor harvests and food shortages of the early modern Little 
Ice Age were the fundamental catalyst to north-west European expansion into the wider world? 
And thus to the human activities which paved the way for the Anthropocene? 
Dipesh  Chakrabarty  speaks  of  humanity  “stumbling”  into  the  Anthropocene,  Tom 
Griffiths of “tumbling” into it.
26 Viewed through a standard historical prism this in itself should 
not  surprise.  As  Holocene  humanity  became  organised  in  increasingly  populous,  complex 
societies,  the  possibilities  for  how  history  might  pan  out  became  literally  endless.  Human 
agency intermeshed with a high degree of contingency always determined that much. Yet this 
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22 David Christian, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History (Berkeley CA: University of California 
Press, 2004). His schema is of Palaeolithic, Holocene and Present Era from c. 1500. 
23 Corfield, “POST-Medievalism,” 381. 
24 Brian Fagan, The Long Summer: How Climate Changed Civilisation (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 
for wider discussion of the entire Holocene sequence. 
25 See Jim Galloway, “Unit 3, Climate Change as Harbinger of Disaster: Population, Famine and Disease 
in the 14
th Century,” in “Past Actions: Present Woes, Future Potential: Rethinking History in the Light of 
Anthropogenic Climate Change: A Teaching Guide by Rescue!History”, 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/heahistory/elibrary/internal/co_levene_pastactions_2010073
1  
26 Chakrabarty, “The Climate,” 217-18; Griffiths, “A Humanist.” 160 / Environmental Humanities 2 (2013) 
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also might suggest why the notion of a human-induced, geological threshold demands all the 
more  serious  historical  scrutiny.  Certainly,  the  emergent,  Western-led,  global  economic-
political  system,  from  c.1750  onwards,  was  hardly  the  first  to  attempt  to  take  control  of 
biospheric flows of energy and resources in excess of Nature’s own ability to replenish. In this 
sense  it  represented  no  more  than  an  addition  to  the  litany  of  societies  whose  signs  of 
impending  collapse  were  marked  by  unmitigated  political  and  social  violence.  The  key 
difference is that while in Mesopotamia, Easter Island, or Maya Meso-America collapse may 
have been isolated to these regions or their hinterlands, the outstanding characteristic of high-
Anthropocene environmental breakdown is that it is likely to take place within a single, human 
world order.
27 
Moreover, what both fuels and drives this global system is the same uniquely historical 
force  that  is  radically  disrupting  those  once  parametric  Holocene  conditions.  It  should  be 
unnecessary to reprise here that what we are talking about is the atmospheric burning in the 
twinkling of a geological eye of a sequestrated but finite source of solar energy, — i.e. rotted 
organic matter, as laid down over 350 million years—at the rate of hundreds of thousands of 
litres  or  kilos  a second.
28 Similarly,  it  should  be  clear  that  this  global  human  system,  qua 
system—leaving  aside  the  climate  consequences—stands  or  falls  on  this  alchemy-like 
conjuring  trick.
29 It  also  happens  to  be  at  the  heart  of  the  ‘metabolic  rift’  (as  ecologically-
minded Marxists would say) that separates that great mass of us from Nature.
30 To be sure, the 
implicit  environmental  destructiveness  of  this  Nature-detached,  capitalist-driven,  fossil-fuel 
enabled, one-way consumerist mode does not apply to the entirety of today’s humanity. One 
paradox of the high-Anthropocene is that there remain billions who live literally by the sweat 
of their brow (dependent as they are on direct solar energy) as did the vast majority of our 
Holocene  forbears.  But  that  discrepancy  only  highlights  a  final,  very  important  division 
between the dominant humans of this current epoch and those who came before.  
In the past there was always religious authority reminding rulers and ruled alike of the 
consequences of overweening appetite, even when that authority was not heeded. The ancient, 
sacred texts called such self-aggrandisement hybris—literally ‘wanton violence’ —against the 
divine  order  of  Nature.
31 Yet  a  key  cultural  characteristic  of  the  high  Anthropocene  is  the 
rejection of any constraint or restraint on material profligacy. On the contrary, it is not simply 
sanctioned, it is universally mandated as the basic building block of economic prosperity and 
growth. And doubly so by dint of a fundamental Enlightenment premise that through scientific 
knowledge humanity might be liberated from both fear as well as perpetual labour. Having 
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27 See Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive (London: Penguin, 2005); 
Joseph A. Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
28 See Tony Waterston, “The Public Health Implications of Climate Change,” power-point presentation, 
Crisis Forum “Climate Change and Violence” workshop 5, York St John University, 18 August 2011, 
http://www.crisisforum.org.uk/events/workshop5_resources.php, for some recent statistics on fossil fuel 
usage. 
29 George Monbiot, Heat: How We Can Stop the Planet Burning (London: Penguin, 2006), 1-3, on the 
Faustian implications of fossil fuel usage.  
30 John Bellamy Foster, “Marx’s Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for Environmental 
Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 105, no. 2 (1999): 366-405. 
31 McIntosh, Hell, chapter 5, “Pride and Ecocide,” esp. 112, 115. Levene, Climate Blues / 161 
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arrived, ostensibly, at the conditions for material happiness, the small matter of environmental 
overreach  appears  to  have  no  moral,  let  alone  economic  standing,  at  least  for  the  social 
organism as a whole. To be sure, it is precisely the science of the matter which should be 
scaring us witless. Yet the paradox is that minus the psycho-dynamic grounding—historically 
provided by religious notions of ‘good’ and ‘evil’—which might otherwise have enabled our 
individual  and  collective  imaginations  to  be  mentally  alert  to  the  crisis,  Anthropocene 
humanity is singularly ill-prepared and desensitised to the planetary Nemesis which awaits it.
32 
 
Future 
When general recognition comes, long after any chance of mitigating the situation has gone, 
there will be both rage and violence. It is unlikely to be limited to a demotic fury. As nation-
states—the  hegemons  in  the  van—struggle  to  secure  for  themselves  the  remaining  residual 
sources of fresh water, food and oil on the planet, the chances of increasingly frenzied, social 
Darwinian conflict tipping over into a spasm of universal self-destruction, the resort to nuclear 
weapons included, are entirely plausible. If this happens it will not be climate change per se 
which  will  bring  the  Anthropocene  to  its  squalid  terminus  but  ourselves.
33 But  even  were 
Western  society  to  avoid  this  particular  fate  (for  billions  in  the  Third  World  violence  has 
already  been  long  in  train)  the  possibility  of  whatever  comes  next  in  terms  of  ongoing 
geological succession including a period of general human recovery or replenishment, remain 
implausible. Our previous reference to hysteresis implies as much, even if by some miraculous 
intervention humanity’s carbon footprint could be cut to zero.  
But how can one be so sure of this bleak prognosis? And, moreover, is it the right and 
proper role of an historian to be making such prognostications at all? Historians are well aware 
that such ‘end is nigh’ claims have been a facet of the more colourful language of disturbed 
individuals, or, more likely, millenarian religious sects, across historical time. And they will 
know that these claims can often tell us valuable things not just about the nature of crisis in 
any given society but its underlying cultural anxieties, indeed milieu. However, such analysis 
does not obviously require the analyst to accept the forecast at face-value.  
Those familiar with the work of David Wasdell’s independent, decade-long and highly 
specialised  quest  to  understand  the  dynamics  of  anthropogenic  climate  change  in  a  truly 
holistic  sense,  may  have  grounds  for  considering  otherwise.  Wasdell’s  project  focuses  on 
combining into a macro-picture the various earth sub-system feedback mechanisms amplifying 
the effect of the anthropogenic disturbance. In this way he has repeatedly confounded more 
conservative estimates for what will be the likely average change in surface temperature before 
the dynamic thermal equilibrium of the planet is re-balanced. If this more or less one-man 
attempt to bring everything together into a dynamic climate system matrix makes Wasdell an 
undoubted  maverick,  he  remains  one  who  is  not  only  an  accredited  reviewer  for  the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) but somebody—perhaps in no small part 
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32 Sigurd Bergmann and Heather Eaton, “Awareness Matters: Introductory Remarks about the Interwoven 
Gifts of Life and Belief,” in Bergmann and Eaton, Ecological Awareness, 3, for exploration of the notion 
of ‘wakefulness’ to our current situation. 
33 Mark Levene, “Afterword: From Past to Future: Prospects for Genocide and its Avoidance in the 21
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Century,” in The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, eds. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses 
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because he is not governed by political or institutional constraints—who is repeatedly invited 
to speak to the highest levels of state and inter-state governance around the world.  
In  early  2011,  Wasdell  produced  the  latest  of  his  ongoing  studies  on  the  value  of 
climate sensitivity: put simply, the likely change in the earth’s temperature as measured against 
changes in its atmospheric composition, including the amplification effects from the feedback 
dynamics of the natural world. Wasdell’s number-crunching conclusions are that once one 
factors in all the feedbacks, which he argues most of the major computer models to date have 
only partially or incorrectly done, the value of climate sensitivity would have to be increased 
by a factor of two and a half times that currently endorsed by the last IPPC (4
th) Assessment 
Report in 2007. In terms of average surface temperature rise this would mean a difference 
between a consensual figure of three degrees and the minimum of 7.8 degrees Celsius which 
Wasdell proposes should now replace it.
34 
Let us try and put these figures into a layman’s context. The historically dramatic shift 
from the Medieval Warm Period to the Little Ice Age around 1300 AD involved a temperature 
fluctuation in the range of about one degree.
35 Standard “state, corporate and NGO responses 
to climate change are predicated on normative assumptions of a 2 degree… ‘dangerous limit’” 
even if this figure tells us more about how policy makers seek to construct climate change as a 
quantifiable but manageable future problem rather than as something dangerous now.
36 Mark 
Lynas in his rightly acclaimed Six Degrees, presents a series of gut-wrenching insights into how, 
as we might approach the five degree marker, our planet becomes increasingly unrecognisable 
and the chances for sustaining life on it decrease to zero. One might add that before even three 
degrees— w h i c h  r i s k  a s s e s s o r s ,  w o r k i n g  t o  t h e  p r e c a u t i o n a r y  p r i n c i p l e  a n d  l i n k e d  t o  c o s t-
benefit  analysis,  still  use  to  make  calculative  planning  geared  towards  long-term  societal 
recovery—the  scale  of  destruction  and  the,  by  then,  likely  run  away  effects  of  feedback 
amplification  make  of  the  figure  an  irrelevance.
37 Significantly  when  Lynas  arrives  at  six 
degrees—the IPCC’s worst-case scenario—he only offers evidence from the deep geological 
record  to  demonstrate  what  the  earth  might  be  like.  There  were  indeed  great  swings  of 
temperature in the past; after all, we have been living in a very unusually benign episode 
within a Quaternary (Pleistocene, Holocene and now Anthropocene) range in which ice ages 
have been the norm. What Lynas emphasises, however, is how the shift into climate change in 
previous  epochs  was  associated  with  the  gradual,  then  dramatic  build-up  of  interacting 
composites of positive feedbacks. The relevant literature repeatedly focuses on the release of 
high levels of methane hydrates into the atmosphere. It was such an eruption which brought 
about the mass extinction event at the end of the Permian period, 251 million years ago, the 
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34 David Wasdell, “Critical Issues in the Domain of Climate Dynamics,” Paper presented to the 
Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge, 3 November 2010, www.apollo-
gaia.org/Climate%20Sensitivity.pdf 
35 Griffiths, “A humanist.” 
36 Christopher Shaw, “Dangerous Limits; Climate Change and Modernity,” in History at the End of the 
World?: History, Climate Change and the Possibility of Closure, eds. Mark Levene, Rob Johnson and 
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worst of its kind in the geological record, wiping out 95 per cent of species on earth. It took a 
mere “50 million years—well into the Jurassic—before anything like pre-extinction levels of 
bio-diversity  returned.”
38 The  escape  of  methane  from  the  permafrost  of  a  melting  Arctic 
happens  to b e  c u r r e n t l y  a  p o i n t  o f  a c u t e  a n x i e t y  a m o n g  e a r t h  s c i e n t i s t s  s t u d y i n g  t h e  
circumpolar effects of climate change.
39 And Lynas was ‘only’ speaking of six degrees. Not the 
7.8 degrees of Wasdell’s calculation.  
 
Present  
What, then, is the point of pursuing this argument at all, unless perhaps as some peculiar 
statement  at  the  far  end  of  deep  ecology  or  ‘disanthropic’  thought  celebrating  humanity’s 
demise?
40 I would certainly concur with the critique expressed in ‘Uncivilisation, The Dark 
Mountain Manifesto’, that “our whole way of living is already passing into history.”
41 But what 
equally should matter is the manner of that passing and most fundamentally whether it can be 
achieved without a resort to an amplified version of the violence we are already perpetrating 
against our planet and ourselves. Alastair McIntosh has put the matter eloquently: 
 
The question of whether technology, politics and economic muscle can sort the problem is 
the small question. The big question is about sorting the human condition. It is the question 
of how we can deepen our humanity to cope with possible waves of war, famine, disease 
and refugees without such outer wounds festering to inner destruction.
42 
 
From this perspective, climate change as such is the occasion, not the cause of humanity’s 
ultimate challenge. Or put interrogatively, in “living the pathos of the end” does there remain a 
way of “bringing hope to crisis,”
43 perhaps even a summoning of humanity towards a reason 
(in the ancient, philosophical sense of Logos) for our twilight existence? Arnold Toynbee’s great 
valedictory work, Mankind and Mother Earth, an all-encompassing metahistory of ‘civilisation’ 
within its biospheric context, intimated that human salvation ultimately can only come through 
the abandonment and renunciation of  “suicidal aggressive greed” in favour of an opposite 
ideal founded on a spiritual consciousness of the “non-material and infinite.” The loftiness of 
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the  appeal  combined  with  its  obvious  ethereality,  may  explain  why  few  contemporary 
historians  have time  or  patience  with  this  once  eminent  historian.  Yet  writing  in  the  early 
1970s, Toynbee was prescient in his recognition—considerably before anthropogenic climate 
change was widely understood—that humanity’s potency had become greater than that of the 
biosphere itself and that this carried with it an ability to liquidate all planetary life. Nor did he 
stop  short  of  describing  this  as  nemesis.
44 The  burden  on  today’s  historians  to  share  this 
recognition may simply be too great. But in returning to our profession and hence its broader 
responsibilities  to  the  common  weal,  I  will  conclude  by  briefly  outlining  an  argument  for 
disciplinary purposefulness in the face of ‘the end.’  
In 2007 I asked: “How exactly do we understand the moment we are in?”
45 At that 
juncture I still held onto the faintest of hopes that the political movers within the international 
system might grasp the gravity of the situation as repeatedly urged by the earth scientists and so, 
finally, belatedly, initiate a rapid but orderly retreat from the carbon economy. This was always 
a  remote  prospect  given  the  congruence  between  it  and  the  global  capitalist  economy. 
Moreover, as Jared Diamond has pointed out—where there has been heavy long-term financial 
(and  emotional)  investment  in  any  human  project,  the    “sunk-cost  effect”  generally  rules, 
however redundant or irrational the premise upon which that investment was built.
46 The years 
since 2007 confirm the negative appraisal. Much has been made of the Copenhagen Climate 
Summit  (COP-15)  in  December 2 0 0 9  a s  t h e  g r e a t  m i s s e d  o p p o r t u n i t y .  A n  a l t e r n a t i v e  
assessment might instead focus on the economic meltdown of 14 months earlier as the real 
moment of truth. Faced with the imminent demise of the banking system at the core of an 
economic growth engine which is first cause of all our contemporary biospheric woes, the 
world’s hegemonic leaders blinked and then, in the space of days and hours, proceeded to 
plough all their (our) available resources into propping up that self-same system. Whatever 
course the  ‘recession’ takes hereafter what in world historical-cum-natural historical terms the 
events  of  2008  signify  is  that  the  international  system  qua s y s t e m  l a c k s  t h e  m e c h a n i s m s ,  
imagination  or  will  for  re-setting  humanity  on  a  course  of  renewal.  In  short,  there  is  no 
contingency  Plan-B  and  no  top-down  road-map  bar  the  redundant  and  entirely  unsafe  
‘business as usual’ one. Looked at in terms of a normative longue durée, this hardly matters. 
Sooner  or  later,  an  outworn  order  is  bound  to  implode  or  collapse.  But,  given  the  real, 
environmental crisis against which the 2008 events are set, the latter’s legacy in terms of long-
term human prospects is profoundly cheerless. Carbon reduction aims, hence climate change 
mitigation, always had to operate within a timeline determined by what the biosphere could 
withstand. That mitigation path is now blocked off. As for Nature, metaphorically speaking, it 
has already passed its verdict.      
But if this assessment is correct, it can only raise one of two options for professional 
practitioners of any kind, historians included. The first is to carry on making obeisance to the 
system and attempting to extract whatever short-term professional or individual advantage one 
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can by feeding and supporting its moribund existence.
47 Of course, it will not die quietly. On 
the  contrary,  its  hegemonic  elements,  sooner  or  later,  will  marshal  and  deploy  whatever 
military and/or industrial resources they can throw in the path of the crisis in an attempt to 
recover  what  is  environmentally  unrecoverable.  The  systemic  default  position  on  this  fast-
approaching horizon is geo-engineering. Independent bodies such as the Royal Society are 
likely to be drawn in to give endorsement to such representative projects of high-Modernity, on 
the one hand, the most brazen examples of technical fix yet devised “to take control of the 
climate”, on the other.
48 There is no reason why historians—alongside other professionals—
cannot offer themselves as advisers, cheer-leaders  and  propagandists  for  such  projects.  For 
instance, they may be able to garner policy makers’ praise by helping to smooth the path of 
public opinion towards acceptance, or at least acquiescence of such grand designs, perhaps by 
quoting any number of historical precedents where states have argued their efficacy and need 
in terms of the greater good and alleged long-term developmental benefits. They may even be 
able to offer a rearguard action in support of their institutional autonomy by offering caveats 
and  the  need  for  consultative  processes  and  safeguards  to  be  built  into  these  Promethean 
programmes. Whether they prove futile or otherwise, to align oneself with them is effectively to 
accept a super-enhanced phase of ‘business as usual’, when all logic points to its demise, plus, 
much  more  pointedly, a  p r o l o n g e d  s p a s m  o f  e v e r  m o r e  c o n t r o l l i n g ,  a n n i h i l a t o r y  v i o l e n c e  
whatever the consequences for people and planet.
49 
There is a second option: though it is an entirely more subversive one. It would involve 
prising open and then widening up an alternative space where all those who have repudiated 
the possibility of amelioration through the system can fully concentrate their individual and 
collective  energies  towards  reconciliation  with  Creation—and  hence  reconciliation  with 
ourselves.
50 Such a project does not preclude the probability of an end to humanity in the very 
near future. It cannot be geared towards some dispensation in the face of our extinction. Its 
compensation, if that is in any sense an appropriate term, lies rather in the knowledge that we 
have sought to act as guides towards a reawakened sense of humanity’s interconnectedness 
with the living planet, and in that process may have helped facilitate a recovery of wisdoms, 
both practical and spiritual, which have eluded most of humankind through the long centuries 
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of hubris and domination. I do not have the scope here to fully develop this theme. Necessarily, 
in down-to-earth terms, such a project can only be geared towards a right-living in which 
actual  or  anticipated  material  scarcity  is  both  cultivated  and  celebrated  instead  as  an 
abundance.  The  path  towards  reconciliation  is  also  one  fundamentally  grounded  in  the 
principles of non-violence. That said, the notion of alternative space may take many forms and 
operate on many levels. A great myriad of individuals, communities and groups world-wide, 
consciously, or unconsciously, practice its tenets.  
What could the historical discipline bring to this quest? First of all, as we have already 
implied, a re-alignment of history with natural history. That, interestingly, would also mean the 
re-population of our alternative space with peoples who have repeatedly been flung to the very 
margins or even beyond history altogether by dint of their  ‘primitiveness’ and, or, non- or 
counter-relationship with dominant, progress-driven Modernity. In other words, all the hunter-
gatherers,  nomads,  peasants,  and  migrants,  past  and  present,  each  in  their  different  ways 
steeled in resource scarcity; each with implicit and explicit notions of restraint and limitation 
built into their cultures and cosmologies. By high-Anthropocene nearly all of these diverse 
societies  have  become  the  poor,  weak  and  dispossessed  of  the  earth.  And  yet  for  serious 
paradox, through the very resilience built into their fibres, these are the self-same societies 
most likely, if any, to become the epoch’s survivors.
51   
Of course, one might argue that historians have taken into their embrace all manner of  
‘subaltern’  groups,  and  through  the  adoption  of  many  linguistic,  psychological  and 
anthropological insights worked towards an empathetic exploration of the mentalité of diverse 
human cultures. But it is one thing to analyse a society (even lovingly), quite another to take it 
seriously. How for instance, do we respond to something one of my students uncovered in her 
research on Australian aboriginal views of water as something which is  “living” and, therefore, 
has “moral, spiritual and social consequences”? 
52 In other words, are we willing to take on 
board both the practical life-skills and cosmologies of human communities living before or 
apart  from  dominant  Anthropocene  modes,  not  as  if  they  were  relics  of  some  quaint  but 
outdated yesteryear but as cultures which might teach the rest of us something not just about 
managing our material wants but psychological well-being in times of unending adversity?
53 To 
continue the antipodean thread, while it was clearly the benign Holocene which forged the 
general  environmental  conditions  enabling  humanity’s  mainstream  take-off  towards 
civilisations,  from  our  present v a n t a g e  p o i n t  h o w  m i g h t  w e  v i e w  t h e  u t t e r l y  v e r s a t i l e  a n d  
culturally creative Aborigines who sustained themselves through persistent ice-age droughts in 
the central Australian deserts from fifty thousand years earlier?
54 
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What is at stake is more than space but also time. There is, of course, the Braudelian 
long-view.
55 Magnificent and life-affirming as it is, whether it is anymore sufficient to getting to 
grips with the anthropocenic temporal rupture we are now living through than Spenglerian 
pessimism—for all the latter’s insight into a ‘Faustian’ (Western) civilisational striving for the 
unattainable—is debatable.
56 The probability of foreclosure on the human experience as an 
ultimate consequence of such striving has carried with it herein the argument that it ought to 
be  making  historians  especially  think  long  and  hard  about  our  place  in  universal  time. 
Explorations by physicists of a space-time continuum have led to dramatic shifts towards a 
four-dimensional model of phenomenal reality.
57 Whether such insights can offer solace for the 
rest  of  a  humanity  ‘imprisoned’  within  its  climate-induced  hour-glass,  remain  doubtful. 
Breaking out from that would require us instead to be able to see some human point and 
purposefulness as we move towards the end.  
Interestingly, there have been historians who, while they may not have been able to 
confront  the  notion  of  species’  obliteration,  have  not  only  grappled  with  realities  of 
catastrophic historical rupture but have sought to interpret such events as containing the seeds 
of  a  life-transforming  potential.  One  who  stands  out  is  the  German-Jewish  historian-
philosopher, Walter Benjamin. In various writings culminating in his posthumously published 
Theses on the Philosophy of History, from 1940, Benjamin contrasted ‘empty time’ with what 
he  called  ‘Now-time’  (Jetztzeit).  What  is  also  striking  about  the  contrast  is  Benjamin’s 
representation  of  the  former  as  quantitative,  homogenous  linearly  ‘progressive’  and  by 
implication  Taylorian  clock-orientated  time,  compared  with  the  qualitatively  ‘filled’  but 
heterogeneous historical time of the latter. In short, Benjamin’s repudiation of the former also 
carries as its corollary not just his affirmation of ‘Now-time’ but as an expression of historical 
messianism.
58 
Benjamin’s sense of historical rupture came out of the early 20
th century catastrophes of 
Modernity,  Nazism  included,  set  against  the  initial  optimism  engendered  by  the  Russian 
Revolution. In fact, various thinkers—Ernst Bloch, Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem whether or 
not associated alongside Benjamin with the Frankfurt school—found themselves mid-century, 
grappling with repeated spates of political and environmental catastrophe which progressive 
conceptions  of  history  dismissed  as  little  more  than  unfortunate  aberrations  or  collateral 
damage on the forward march of Modernity. By contrast, our dissenting voices struggled both 
to find a wider but “discontinuous vision of temporality” against the inevitability of industrial 
civilisation and, at the same time a break-out from “the eternal repetition of the ever-the-same” 
into a “qualitatively distinct utopian world.”
59 The fact that they shared Jewish origins, does not 
obviously explain their embrace of actually very subversive Judaic ideas given that nearly all of 
them came from stridently secular backgrounds. Instead, attraction to the messianic seems to 
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have been in major part because it offered a resource for critical thinking about the possibility 
of discontinuity to abstractly ‘progressive’ notions of historical time and, concurrently, a basis 
for a practical regrounding of revolutionary action in which ordinary humans themselves might 
become active agents for radical change.   
Particularly relevant here is a core Judaic idea: Et Ketz, ‘the Time of the End.’ The 
notion  is  predicated  on  a  view  of  temporality  in  which  disjuncture  is  not  aberrant  but 
inseparable  from  the  entire h i s t o r i c a l  s e q u e n c e .  I t  a l s o  i s  o n e  i n  w h i c h  t h e  o v e r t h r o w  o f  
worldly powers, by God—but in which oppressed humanity may have a hand—leads (as in 
biblical prophecy) to the establishment, or re-establishment of  “an age of harmony between 
man and God, between man and Nature, and among men.”
60 To be sure, once one is onto this 
eschatological  terrain,  even  metaphorically,  one  is  effectively  being  drawn  towards 
engagement  with  a  whole  raft  of  millenarian-infused  ideas—utopia,  chiliasm,  prophecy, 
apocalypse—which are usually dissonant, even repulsive to modern, secular ears. But that may 
tell us more about the way Modernity has chosen to suffocate the historical relevance of the 
messianic rather than the ideas themselves. For example, when the language of climate change 
catastrophe is particularly graphic it is often disparagingly referred to as apocalyptic, forgetting 
that the originally Greek term apokalyptein, meant an uncovering of something which had 
been concealed: a revelation. As McIntosh explains: “The word has a technical usage that 
implies  a  transformation,  perhaps  in  consciousness,  by  which  an  existing  corrupt  socio-
ecological order is turned upside down by the astonishing irruption of new hope.”
61 
This also resonates with Toynbee’s juxtaposition between the age-old pursuit of worldly 
material power and the struggle for a spiritual self-mastery.
62 Put into more precise historical 
context,  it  leads  us  back  to  the  civilisational  crises  of  the  Axial  Age  and  to  the  religious 
counter-cultures which not only sought to defy the premises upon which militarily-aggressive 
empires were built, but to guide an oppressed humanity towards genuine paths of redemption. 
In the Judaic case, what was further posed was the creation of a wholly other world, a heaven 
on  earth,  a  New  Jerusalem.  Its  moment  would  come  through  messianic  rupture.  But  as 
Benjamin apprised from Judaic scripture, this need not be a distant moment in the course of an 
otherwise empty time, “for in it every second of time was the narrow gate through which the 
Messiah could enter.”
63 
Benjamin’s desire for an active human participation in the coming of the Kingdom has 
its  close  corollary  in  radical  Christian  usage  of  the  term  kairos. “ T h e  n o t i o n  d e s c r i b e s  
transformation of lived time into a time of action. The translation from the Greek is generally 
given  as  ‘the  right  moment’  or  ‘the  opportune.’”
64 But  this  is  not  simply  a  concept  with 
attraction to theologians. Jacques Derrida, among others, repeatedly explored the notion of a 
time which is ‘out of joint’, and hence unpredictable as also one in which the consequent 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
60 Ibid., 19. 
61 Alastair McIntosh, “Foreward,” in Skrimshire, Future Ethics, ix. 
62 Toynbee, Mankind, 18. 
63 Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History, 1940,” 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/benjamin/1940/history.htm 
64 Stefan Skrimshire, Politics of Fear, Practices of Hope: Depoliticisation and Resistance in a Time of 
Terror (London and New York: Continuum, 2008), 107. Levene, Climate Blues / 169 
	 ﾠ
destabilisation of  “the normal synchronic logic of events” has its own liberating potential.
65 
The linked notions of Et Ketz and kairos as ‘special, chosen, timely time’ which is the God-
given  now i s  s u r e l y  a  b e q u e s t  f r o m  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  r e c o r d  w h i c h  o u g h t  t o  h a v e  p a r t i c u l a r  
resonance for our current situation. We do not have to be religious ‘believers’ to grasp their 
contemporary relevance. From a historian’s point of view what should especially matter is the 
way  during  times  of  relentless,  ongoing,  catastrophic  crisis  ideas  have  emerged  which, 
questioning  the  normative  Zeitgeist,  have  looked  instead  to  the  potential  in  the  human 
condition for wrenching time out of its empty corruption and investing it with a transformative 
power. It is, indeed, ironic that we live today according to a calendar of supposedly normative 
time whose first cause was exactly such a moment of subversive, millenarian rupture.  
What is equally significant about this historically-grounded eschatological resource is 
the manner in which it transcends the argument for purely and simply merging history with 
natural history. Ideas about the end appear to be an outcome of civilisational development 
from the ancient Near East, yet endured when all such civilisations had long gone the way of 
Nineveh.
66  Why?  Fundamentally,  I  suspect,  because  they  are  expressive  of  a  deeper 
consciousness about what is ‘wrong’ with civilisation and what needs to be put right to set 
humanity on its path to reconciliation with itself and Nature. That path implicitly carries with it 
a great inventory of unfinished business by way of environmental and social justice. In our 
own  time,  the  climate  campaigner,  Aubrey  Meyer  exquisitely  captured  the  essence  of  this 
purposefulness  in  his  entirely  scientific  proposition  for  a  route—Contraction  and 
Convergence—by which humankind might arrive at equal carbon entitlements which would 
also provide a practical framework within which yearly, incremental carbon reduction could 
be  brought  to  safe-limits.
67 While  mitigation  of  dangerous  climate  change—and  within  an 
actually, normative time-ordered process—has been the project’s ostensible aim, underlying it 
is an ethical end-goal suffused with compassion and loving-kindness for all living things. Yet 
the reason why Meyer’s proposition has been and remains still-born is not on account of its 
practicality, but, more pointedly, because its implementation would undercut, indeed starve, 
the sources of hegemonic worldly power.  
One can almost speak of Contraction and Convergence in the past tense now because 
the  chronological  time  has  come  and  gone  in  which  the  international  system  might  have 
grasped mitigation as its urgent priority. Looking back from a further vantage point, we are 
unlikely to be surprised by the system’s failure. Indeed, in a sense there was no failure because 
it had nowhere else to go other than ‘business as usual.’ What will be truly disastrous for 
humankind, however, is if—as a consequence of the system’s impending climate-precipitated 
collapse—the rest of us give way to despair, anomie and even greater estrangement from each 
other.  Yet  there  is  an  alternative  to  this  ‘system’  dependency—and  implicit  violence.  As 
believers or agnostics, humanists or atheists, those who were system acolytes who have had 
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their Damascene conversion, or dissenters who were never there in the first place, we might 
yet take into our own hands the opportunity which this crisis now offers: to create our own 
alternative, right-living space and to invest its accompanying special time with meaning. This is 
not the path of resignation but on the contrary, one of heightened awareness followed by 
practical grass-roots action for and by the common weal. Historians might have a critical role 
as pathfinders and beacon carriers in this process by bravely demonstrating that in the context 
of where we find ourselves this is neither misplaced nor lunatic but rather a project whose 
legitimacy and worth is embedded in human consciousness and historical experience.   
The difference now is that we are truly living in an anthropocenic epoch which heralds 
the human end. It is time to put our house in order. For our individual and collective wellbeing 
what other choice do we have but to strive for some measure of what the kabbalists call  tikkun 
olam,  some  healing  of  our  condition  on  this  earth  and  thereby,  with  it,  some  measure  of 
cosmic repair?  Or, as Christians, and indeed not just Christians might put it, so that we might 
finally receive some degree of grace. That, I propose, is something still worth striving for in this 
kairotic time.  
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